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Abstract
Background: Two ADM mnemonic-based methods, SHOR (Wohl, 1981) and DESIDE (Murray, 1997),
have been demonstrated to significantly improve military pilots’ in-flight decision-making performance in
six different tactical situations (Li & Harris, 2005). However, there is little research concerning how to
apply these mnemonics in real world. Method: This research applied focus groups consisting of three
senior flight instructors and one aviation human factors specialist, to investigate how to apply the SHOR
and DESIDE techniques in different types of decision-making scenarios. Results: The qualitative data
suggested that SHOR was the best mnemonic in the recognition-primed decision making scenarios;
DESIDE was the best mnemonic for the scenarios concerning non-diagnostic procedural decisions and
creative problem-solving. Discussion: Pilots would apply SHOR in time-limited and urgent situations as
a result of its concise, logical structure. They chose to use DESIDE when time was available for a more
comprehensive consideration of the situation.
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INTRODUCTION
Pilots frequently make important decisions under time pressure situation and these may have very serious
consequences. Some decisions are made with ambiguous information, in hostile environments, and with
very little time available. A critical component of pilot proficiency is the ability to make good decisions.
Decision skills might be trainable (Kaempf & Orasanu, 1997). Diehl (1991) found that decision errors
contributed to 56% of accidents in airlines and 53% of accidents in military aviation between 1987 and
1989. Shappell and Wiegmann (2004) also found that decision errors contributed to 45% of accidents in
the USAF, and 55% in the US Navy. The early concepts of pilot decision-making were based on models
that reflected the level of thinking in cognitive psychology. These models remain the underlying premise of
many contemporary decision training programs in aviation (Kaempf & Klein, 1994). The research
paradigm of naturalistic decision-making (NDM) has provided an alternative approach for understanding
how pilots make decisions and for designing training interventions that will help pilots when making
decisions under uncertain, high pressure, high stakes, and in time-limited situations (Jensen, 1997). There
are a number of strategies embodied in the mnemonics describing the processes and procedures concerned
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with ADM mnemonic-based methods that could potentially improve pilots’ in-flight decision-making (Li &
Harris, 2005). O’Hare (2003) described several acronyms/mnemonics to guide and structure
decision-making. The aim of these techniques is to form a systematic approach to decision-making that
should be less affected by human biases and should also reduce the cognitive workload for pilots.
However, Orasanu (1993) has pointed out that there was no evidence to support the development of generic
training techniques to improve all-purpose decision making skills, as there were different component skills
involved in making the different basic types of decisions.
Decision-making is a complex cognitive process and is affected by situational and environmental
conditions (Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1988). One of the factors that negatively influences pilot’s
decision-making is psychological stress. Keinan (1987) found that under stress the range of alternatives
and dimensions that are considered during the decision-making process is significantly restricted compared
with normal conditions. For over 30 years the importance of aeronautical decision-making has been
recognized as critical to the safe operation of aircraft. Jensen & Benel (1977) reported that 51% of fatal
general aviation accidents from 1970 through 1974 were associated with decision errors. The key issues
of pilot’s decision-making are time pressure and risk. Mjos (2001) suggested that in emergent situations,
uncertainty might outweigh time pressure as the key stressor bearing on the decision-making strategy.
Aviation environments are often complex and different factors such as problem patterns, aircraft types,
missions, available time, or risk may influence pilots’ in-flight decision-making. Aeronautical knowledge,
skill, and judgment have always been regarded as the three basic faculties that pilots must possess (Diehl,
1991). The requisite knowledge have been imparted in academic and flight training programs and have
subsequently been evaluated as part of the pilot certification process. In contrast, ADM has usually been
considered to be a trait that good pilots innately possess or an ability that is acquired as a by-product of
flying experience (Buch & Diehl, 1984). There is an increased need for military pilots to be trained
specifically in making in-flight decisions in different tactical environments to improve aviation safety.
METHOD
This research applied focus group to develop the contents of two mnemonic methods for ADM training.
The main purpose of focus group research is to draw upon respondents’ beliefs, experiences and reactions
toward a specific topic. Kitzinger (1994) suggested that interaction is the crucial feature of focus groups
as the individuals in a focus group are expressing their own definitive individual view. In this study, the
participants are speaking in a specific context (aviation training), within a specific culture (military).
Participants: The focus group consist of three senior instructor pilots with over 3000 flight hours and one
aviation human factors specialist.
Scenarios: There are three different decision-making scenarios as following described by Orasanu (1993)
and Li & Harris (2005). (1) Recognition-primed decisions: : F-5E right engine fails as a result of Foreign
Object Damage (FOD) just as the nose gear leaves the ground at a speed 165 knots; (2) Non-diagnostic
procedural decisions: Both the leader and wingman in a formation of F-5Es are unable to land at home-base
in a ‘bingo’ (low fuel) situation during instrument flight in bad weather; (3) Creative problem-solving:
When flying an F-5F both left and right generators fail at the same time during a tactical manoeuvre.
ADM Mnemonics: Two ADM mnemonic-based methods, SHOR (Stimuli, Hypotheses, Options, Response;
Wohl, 1981) and DESIDE (Detect, Estimate, Set safety objectives, Identify, Do, Evaluate; Murray, 1997),
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could potentially improve the quality of pilots’ decision-making were selected from a review of the
literature (Li & Harris, 2005).
Data collection: The participants had participated three focus groups, each focus group concentrated on one
scenario. The participants were asked to using both SHOR and DESIDE mnemonics in those six different
scenarios, and describing how to step by step applying the procedures of both SHOR and DESIDE
mnemonics in each scenario according to the specific context and situations.
RESULT AND DISCUSSION
In the Recognition-primed decision scenario an engine failure as a result of FOD (Foreign Objects
Damage), pilots must make a quick decision to deal with urgent situation. The findings confirm the
quicker the better, as the result SHOR was the best fitted for this urgent situation. As soon as pilots
assessed the situations properly (hypotheses) and quickly evaluated the options for safe actions, the
response strategies were retrieved on the basis of their past training experience in this situation. The experts
found that SHOR was effective with specific actions specified for completion in a very short time. On the
other hand, there was no enough time to take a full detail consideration (DESIDE) to generate the best
strategy to deal with this situation, as DESIDE has too many steps, requires more consideration, more time
consuming and more dangerous in this urgent situation (see table 1).
In the scenario where both the leader and wingman are unable to land in a ‘bingo’ situation in bad weather
(non-diagnostic procedural decisions), it was not particularly urgent situations, however, pilots may
perceive potential risk in front of them for the nature of this problem is unclear. The results indicate that
low fuel is not an emergency situation and needs comprehensive considerations, SHOR is not the best
strategy. There is a need to consider more risks and benefits for other alternative landing airfields, SHOR
is not capable of analyzing a complex situation. However, DESIDE is good for situation assessment
(Estimate) and provides specific analysis for safe operations (Identify) as this scenario is not urgent
allowing pilots to think thoroughly. Furthermore, DESIDE has a logical order - easy to remember for
pilots in the aviation environments (see table 1).
In the creative problem-solving scenarios such as both left and right generators failure, these tasks are the
most complex involved both diagnosis to determine the nature of the situation and response generation.
Once the nature of the problem has been determined, it may be found that there are no recommendations in
the manuals. Pilots must determine what their goals are, develop a plan and candidate strategies, and
evaluate these strategies and planned actions based on projections of outcomes (Orasanu, 1993). According
to the results, the SHOR has a positive effect in quick and simple for making response if the participants
feel it was an urgent situation. However, if participants think that it was not an urgent situation DESIDE
would be applied. The qualitative comments of Instructors revealed that DESIDE was regarded as
promoting an effective response in a non-time-limited situation (the backup battery has about nine minutes
power for both generators failures). It was also regarded as progressing in a logical order and was easy to
remember for the re-evaluate (Evaluate) new situation promote the situation awareness by counting 9
minutes for knowing battery’s available time and calculating the distance to home base (see table 1).
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Table 1: Summary of Applying SHOR and DESIDE Mnemonics Step-by-step in Three Different
Decision-making Scenarios Generated by Focus Groups
Mnemonics SHOR DESIDE
Scenario of
Recognition-primed
decisions:
F-5E right engine
fails as a result of
Foreign Object
Damage (FOD) just
as the nose gear
leaves the ground at
a speed 165 knots.
Stimuli
(1) The attitude for taking off had been set
up.
(2) Right engine had blast sound and then
power off.
(3) Left engine was normal.
(4)Speed for taking off was changed.
Hypotheses
(1) Assumed that right engine’s power off
was resulted from FOD or IOD.
Options
(1)Abort take-off immediately.
(2)To continue taking off with single
engine.
(3)Eject or not?
Response
(1)Continue taking off with single engine
(2)The remaining runway and present speed
are enough to abort take-off, but the risk
to stop aircraft safely is high.
Detect
(1) When the attitude for taking-off had been set up and
nose gear left runway, right engine had blast sound
and power was out
Estimate
(1) The right engine should be damaged by FOD or IOD
Set Safety Objectives
(1) Abort take-off and stop the aircraft immediately.
(2)To make use of the remaining runway to take off
safely.
Identify
(1) The attitude for taking-off had been set up and the
speed was enough for taking off.
(2)Left engine could provide enough power to take off.
(3)The remaining runway and the speed were enough for
aborting take-off safely.
Do
(1) Take action for taking off with a single engine.
Evaluate
(1) The left engine’s reliability.
(2) The difficulty for single engine operation.
(3) The extra burden for emergency procedure.
Scenario of
Non-diagnostic
procedural
decisions:
Both the leader and
wingman in a
formation of F-5Es
are unable to land at
home-base in a
‘bingo’ (low fuel)
situation during
instrument flight in
bad weather.
Stimuli
(1)Home base weather was worse.
(2)One mile on final with 600 ft altitude
from runway the formation was out of
cloud but the angle between the flight
line and the runway was too great to
land.
(3)No.2 could not land and requested
go-around.
(4)No.2 had remaining gasoline of 1300 lb.
Hypotheses
(1) It was predicted that home base weather
was improper for landing.
(2) No.2 was inexperienced in operation.
(3) Ground controller was inexperienced.
Options
(1)To land the other base.
(2)To re-join GCA pattern.
Response
(1) It was the safest option to land YU
base.
Detect
(1)Home base weather had to rely on GCA for landing.
(2)No.2 couldn’t land and had low fuel
Estimate
(1)Both pilot’s ability of instrument flight and
controller’s experience were uncertainty.
(2)The determination had to be made immediately to
avoid unnecessary fuel consumption.
Set Safety Objectives
(1)To land YU safely.
Identify
(1)The safest determination was to land YU base.
Do
(1)Call ground controller guiding No.2 to land at YU.
(2)Ask ZN Approach to guide No.2 landing at YU with
the first priority.
(3) Instruct No.2 adjust TACAN frequency to YU and
climb to the top of clouds.
Evaluate
(1)To avoid spatial disorientation.
(2)To avoid consuming fuel for unnecessary operation.
(3)To follow ground controller’s direction.
Scenario of
Creative
problem-solving:
When flying an F-5F
both left and right
generators fail at the
same time during a
tactical manoeuvre.
Stimuli
(1)The master caution light was blinking.
(2)Left and right generators’ alert lights
were lit.
(3)It didn’t work to reset the switch.
Hypotheses
(1)The situation was the battery for 9
minutes, some equipment couldn’t be
operated.
Options
(1)Stop training immediately.
(2)Ask GCA to locate aircraft’s position
and request guiding to home base with
first priority.
(3)To economize power with the greatest
possibility.
Response
(1)Stop training immediately and announce
the emergency situation to ground control.
(2)Shut off unnecessary electrical
equipment for saving battery power.
(3)Join long final straight-in without flaps.
(4)Operate landing gear alternate extension
when necessary.
Detect
(1)The master caution light was blinking.
(2)Both left and right generator caution lights were lit.
(3)It didn’t work to reset the switches.
Estimate
(1)Lots of equipment would be failed.
(2)The battery could only provide power for 9 minutes.
(3)To rely on ATC’s guidance for the navigation data
was unreliable after generators failed.
Set Safety Objectives
(1)To master aircraft’s situation for safe landing.
Identify
(1) To request ground control to locate aircraft position
and guide to home base with first priority.
(2) It would increase safety if the other wingman nearby
could assemble together to return base.
(3) To identify the possibility to fly under clouds.
Do
(1)To stop training immediately.
(2)To request ground control to locate aircraft position
and guide to home base with first priority.
Evaluate
(1)If there were other wingman for formation, it would
be the main reference.
(2)To count 9 minutes for knowing battery’s available
time and calculating the distance to base.
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CONCLUSION
The narrative data that the participants provided describing how experts would deal with the problems
presented in each scenario suggested that the SHOR mnemonic was generally applied in the urgent
situations such as recognition-primed decision-making scenario; DESIDE was most commonly used in
non-urgent situations such as the non-diagnostic procedural decision-making scenario and creative
problem-solving. A similarity of these two mnemonic-based methods is that they all start from situation
assessment for gaining situation awareness, including fast changing abnormal situations in a dynamic
environment. Both of SHOR and DESIDE follow a logical structure to form the safest strategy. They
share some common characteristics but have certain differences (1) SHOR have only four steps for quick
decision-making; DESIDE have six steps for more comprehensive considering a changing situation
resulting from the pilots original actions. (2) SHOR was originally developed for use in the Air Force
Tactical Command and Control situations; DESIDE been developed for using in Civil Airlines, as parts of
CRM training. (3) SHOR was an extension of the stimulus-response (S-R) paradigm of classical
behaviourist psychology (Wohl, 1981), however, the DESIDE model is also based on conflict-theory model
(Janis & Mann, 1977). The results obtained in this study support the conclusions of the earlier opinion
survey. These two mnemonics do promote better ADM and there is now empirical evidence to
demonstrate how to step-by-step applying SHOR and DESIDE mnemonics for improving pilots in-flight
decision-making.
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